
Europe is facing a productivity crisis, with its labor productivity growing only half as quickly as that of the United States over the past 25 years. This disparity has widened the income gap between Europe and the US. While European economies benefit from higher public spending and better labor-market institutions, the lack of productivity improvements poses risks to both the economy and democracy.
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This concern is echoed by Mario Draghi, former president of the European Central Bank, who describes the urgency of enhancing productivity as an existential challenge. In response, he and other European leaders have formed the Rhine Group, highlighting that only four of the world's fifty largest technology companies are based in Europe.
Europe finds itself squeezed between the US and China. Although the US holds a slight lead in AI and other advanced technologies, China is quickly closing the gap. From 2000 to 2022, China's share of international patent applications surged from 3% to 33%, while the EU’s share dropped from 30% to 16%. This has led to calls within Europe to emulate the technological models of these superpowers, but neither offers a viable template for European needs.
The Silicon Valley approach to innovation, supported by venture capital and strong ties to research, has driven significant advancements in the digital era. However, it often fails to distribute the benefits of these innovations broadly, which is essential for overall productivity gains. Historical trends show that periods of significant innovation do not necessarily correlate with productivity increases. For instance, the US experienced a productivity growth slowdown after the 1970s oil shocks, despite continuous technological innovation leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic.
China's productivity growth relies heavily on manufacturing sectors such as electric machinery and electronics. While this focus on manufacturing has generated jobs and innovation historically, it may not be the best path for Europe, which is increasingly service-oriented. Attempting to replicate China's industrial policies could be misguided, except in cases tied to national security.
Increasing productivity in the services sector presents distinct challenges. Europe cannot compete directly with the US and China; instead, it must cultivate its own productivist model. This entails promoting the deployment and dissemination of technological and organizational innovations across its economy.
For instance, Europe has historically excelled at adopting innovations developed elsewhere. It established the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) standard for mobile technology, outpacing the US in mass adoption. France effectively transformed nuclear energy technology into a major power source, and Germany leveraged industrial robots most efficiently in its factories.
However, there have been setbacks as well. European inventions like the internal combustion engine and wind turbine did not translate into leadership in their respective markets. Europe currently lags in the semiconductor sector, a crucial component of modern technology.
Addressing Europe's productivity issue requires a shift in focus from innovation alone to the application and diffusion of new technologies. This could involve targeted industrial policies that promote public-private collaboration and address specific bottlenecks across various sectors. An emphasis on technological adoption and diffusion, especially in the service industry, could enhance productivity significantly.
While Europe's AI capabilities raise complex issues, the underlying solution remains investment in appropriate deployment. As the benefits of AI will largely arise from its usage rather than merely from the location of data centers, a focus on effective application may be more critical than geographical considerations.
Upholding Europe's social market economy model is also essential. Unlike the US approach, Europe's goal should be to utilize technology for the benefit of society, ensuring that innovation serves the people.